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I: Introduction: 
The role of households’ expectations in determining aggregate outcomes, such as business 
cycles and inflation dynamics, is well established. However, how households form their 
expectations about the macroeconomy is less well studied. In a recent seminal study Carroll (2003 
and 2006) addresses the issue of how households form expectations about the aggregate economy, 
especially inflation expectations. Carroll (2003 and 2006) put forward the idea of ‘epidemiological 
expectations’. Households form their inflation expectations by observing the professionals’ 
forecasts. However, they do not observe the professionals’ perfectly and it is ‘absorbed’ over time 
and eventually transmitting throughout the entire population. This provides the microfoundations 
for rational inattentive behavior or ‘sticky information expectations’. Recent papers have used such 
expectations to study inflation dynamics (Mankiw and Reis, 2002) and their implications for 
monetary policy (Ball et al, 2004). 
In a related research Mankiw et al (2004) considered how disagreements may arises 
amongst different agents’ inflation expectations. They conclude that any disagreements and 
heterogeneity found amongst various professionals’ and households’ inflation forecasts largely arise 
due to the varying rates these agents update their relevant information set.  
So far empirical analyses have largely considered how households learn from the 
professionals’ forecasts. Households are treated as a homogenous group where they absorb at same 
rate or, indeed, the estimates only establish the average rate by which households absorb. In the 
present paper, using a unique survey-based data for the UK, we consider whether different agents, 
or groups, that make up the population have different absorption rates. We identify agents who are 
‘active’ and ‘passive’ learners. The distinction is made based on their respective absorption rates. 
There are some important implications for these results. In the first instance, it highlights and 
enables us to understand inflation expectations heterogeneity that clearly exists throughout the 
population. Distinguishing and identifying ‘active’ and ‘passive’ learners also has direct 
implications for inflation dynamics and the pursuit of monetary policy. So far inflation models that 
 3
use ‘sticky information expectation’ suggests a single rate of absorption amongst households which 
reflects the average. If, for instances, the ‘active’ agent is someone who is crucial for the wage and 
price-setting process, such as trade union officials or financial directors, then their rate of absorption 
would be more important and the general public’s in determining inflation dynamics.  
In subsequent section we outline a theoretical model which extends the Carroll (2003) 
analysis to account for different types of learning agents. Section 3 undertakes the empirical 
investigation based on the extended model and, finally, Section 4 draws the main points and 
concluding remarks.  
II: Professional Forecasters, Active and  
Passive Learning Agents: The Model 
 
 In this section we outline the theoretical framework which is used as the basis for the 
ensuing empirical analysis. Carroll (2003 and 2006) establishes that the professional’s forecasts are 
absorbed by households and are transmitted throughout the entire population. Nevertheless, the 
absorption rate may vary between different groups that make-up the entire population. Thereby, 
indicating heterogeneity amongst the general public despite learning from a common source. 
The model outlined here considers two types of stylized general public: the active and 
passive learner. They are simply distinguished by the rate they absorb the professional’s forecasts, 
where the active has a higher rate than the passive learner. We assume that both the active and 
passive general public (GP,A and GP,P respectively) may set their inflation expectations using the 
professional’s forecasts as an ‘anchor’ or a reference point. Hence, the active learner forms his 
expectations ( )( 1
*
+t
HA
tE π ) as a ratio of the professional’s1: 
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1 For notational convenience we assume the expectations are demeaned; this assumption of zero-intercept is relaxed in 
the empirical analysis. The * character denotes that ratios are measured over large spans of data in which people learn 
from the professional forecaster, i.e. over the long run.  
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Likewise, the passive learner forms his expectations ( )( 1
*
+t
HP
tE π ) as a ratio of the professional’s:  
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where 0; ,, >PGPAGP ββ . Different segments of the population may set different ratios. They 
may target inflation obtained from varying notions of consumer prices, possibly due to different 
consumption baskets. For example, what media simply report as “inflation” is often measured 
on the basis of different price indexes, such as CPI (Consumer Price Index, whose inflation has 
been officially targeted by the Bank of England since December 2003), or the “traditional” 
RPIX (Retail Price Index, whose basket composition differs to that of CPI by about 10%). The 
learning agents observe the professional’s forecasts imperfectly and are absorbed over time, 
albeit at different rates2:   
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The active learner absorbs faster that the passive and 0,, >> PGPAGP αα . 
Now we assume that the active and passive learners’ two-step and one-step ahead 
expectations (based on their information set in t-1) evolve as follows:  
                     GPtt
GP
tt
GP
t uEE 1111 )()( +−+− += ππ  (5) 
where GP1tu +  is a zero-mean and constant variance idiosyncratic random error. This departs from 
the more restrictive assumption in Carroll (2003) where it was assumed 01 =+GPtu . Occasionally, 
in period t-1 the individual learning agent may have relevant information about changes that 
could affect inflation in t+1 (i.e. a further step ahead); for example pre-announced monetary 
                                                 
2 Carroll (2006) suggests that the professional’s forecasts can be absorbed via the news media and/or social interaction. 
In the present scenario we assume that learning agents (or various segments of the population), for example trade union 
officials, may consult professional forecasters directly, albeit periodically.    
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and fiscal policy. It must also be assumed that GP1tu +  are not related with professional’s forecasts 
formed using the information set in t, )(E 1t
P
t +π .  
The professional’s forecasts, on the other hand, are set independently. Following Carroll 
(2003) it is assumed that next-period inflation process is captured by two components: 
1t
f
1t1t +++ += κππ . The fundamental rate of inflation 11 ++ += tftft ηππ  – whose changes are due 
to permanent innovations tη  – and the unforecastable transitory shock 1t+κ . Hence, the 
professional forecasts in t for t+1 are )(E)(E)(E)(E f 1t
P
t1t
P
t
f
1t
P
t1t
P
t ++++ =+= πκππ , and the 
professional forecaster updates his forecasts as follows: 
      )()()( 111 +−+ += tPtftPtftPt EEE ηππ          (6) 
or                        )()()( 111 +−+ += tPttPttPt EEE ηππ       (7) 
where )( 1+t
P
tE π  and )( 1+tPtE η  denotes the professional’s expectations of inflation and permanent 
innovation respectively. We assume the professional forecaster has some idea about how the one-
step ahead fundamental rate may differ from the current rate by defining )(E 1t
P
t +η  as a random 
variable with unconditional mean equal to zero and constant unconditional variance3. 
Previous assumptions can be summarized in the following system of interacting agents, 
that is active and passive learner and the professional forecaster:  
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The system of equations can be reparameterized in the following way in order to explain inflation 
forecasts changes from t to t+1: 
                                                 
3 This follows from a similar assumption made in Carroll (2006) (see footnote 3).   
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The dynamic relationship between the respective expectations changes can be represented as a 
matrix equation: 
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where the two random terms GPtε  are defined as a weighted average of both learners and 
professionals random terms:  
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The matrix notation above, can be better interpreted as a Vector Equilibrium-Correction 
Mechanism (VECM):  
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The professional’s forecasts evolve independently, while the learning agents form their expectations 
absorbing, or adjusting, to the professional’s at different rates αGP determining, as pointed out by 
equations (3)-(4), whether the respective learning agents are ‘active’ or ‘passive’ learners when 
forming their inflation expectations. 
The model we outlined has some implications for the empirical behavior of the variables of 
interest. Firstly, as far as the unit root properties of the variables of interest is concerned, equation 
(7) implies that professional’s inflation forecasts are first order integrated, i.e. I(1). Further, 
equations (1)-(2), together with (5), implies that the two active/passive learners forecasts are both 
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I(1) at univariate level, and both cointegrated with professional’s forecasts, CI(1,1), at multivariate 
level.  
Secondly, following the preceding implication, VECM (9) must be a valid depiction of the 
joint dynamic behavior of the variables of interest in view of the Granger representation theorem 
(see Engle and Granger, 1987). In the present context, the cointegrating rank of the system – i.e. the 
number of cointegrating relationships – is equal to the number of learning agents. After model 
estimation, the residuals GPtεˆ  in VECM (9) are expected to be positively correlated with those of the 
professional’s forecasts ( )(Eˆ 1t
P
t +η ).  
Thirdly, the structure of the loading factor matrix of α parameters in VECM (9) implies that 
the professional’s forecasts should be weakly exogenous for the cointegrating relations and their 
adjustment coefficients, see Johansen (1992, 1995). The weak exogeneity property allows for a 
simplification of VECM (9) structure in the partially-modelled two-variables VECM (10), which 
makes possible to exploit the simultaneous information embodied in )(E 1t
P
t +πΔ . 
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where GPη are parameters which measure the impact of )(E 1tPt +η  on learning individuals and, given 
the equation (8) for GPtε , we have that GPGPGP βαη = . As a result, GPtν  are random terms which 
embody only the information about GP1tu +  structural errors and, given equation (8), may be 
represented as GP1tGP
GP
t u)1( +−= αν  . In other terms, the estimate of in model (10) allows to make 
more efficient inferences about the learners’ parameters of interest, as it does not require modelling 
professional’s forecasts behavior. Note also that in the light of VECM (9) weak exogeneity also 
entails strong exogeneity, as in the short run the other forecasts cannot Granger-cause professional’s 
forecasts. 
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Finally, though the whole structural model has been set up under linear assumptions, the 
absorption rates may also  be non-linear, as the learning agent may absorb at varying rates and the 
absorption rate itself may take different forms. The issues pertaining nonlinearity will also be 
investigated in Section III.3.  
III: Empirical Analysis and Results:  
 The remainder of the paper considers the empirical implications of the theoretical model 
outlined in the preceding section. The empirical investigation identifies which learning agents are 
‘active’ and ‘passive’ based on their absorption rates. In addition, we also consider whether these 
absorption rates are non-linear.   
III.1: Data: Univariate unit roots and bivariate common trends and dynamics: 
The data used in the present analysis are quarterly data complied by Barclays Basix based 
on surveys of various sections of the UK population. The period covered is from the fourth quarter 
of 1986 to the first quarter of 2005; this is the entire period of this dataset compiled by Barclay 
Basix. Since the 2005 Q1 they abandoned collecting the relevant information at a disaggregate level 
and just focused on the ‘general public’. This unique dataset has the advantage of categorizing, or 
disaggregating, the agents surveyed. They can be divided into economists: business economists (be) 
and academic economists (ae), and non-economists: financial directors (fd), trade unionists (tu) and 
general public (gp). The surveyed are simply asked: 
Can you tell me what you expect the rate of inflation to be over the next twelve months? 
The compiled figures are the average of the respondents in each category. Inflation forecasts one 
year ahead of the surveyed groups of agents are depicted in the first five plots of Figure 1. 
Following the notation adopted in the previous section, each series may be denoted as )(E 1t
g
t +π , 
where g = be, ae, fd, tu and gp. The time patterns appear to be the same for all forecasts: long 
waves and strong persistence suggesting the presence of stochastic trends (e.g. the first principal 
component of the five forecast levels explains almost 99 percent of the overall variance, and simple 
correlations are in the 0.91-0.99 range).  
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Figure 1 about here 
Preliminary inspection of the inflation forecasts focuses on their univariate stochastic 
properties. The p-values of unit root tests for inflation forecasts levels )(E 1t
g
t +π  (see Dickey and 
Fuller, 1979) and of autocorrelation LM test up to the 4th order for inflation forecasts in first 
differences )(E 1t
g
t +πΔ  (see Godfrey, 1988) are reported respectively in the first two rows of Table 
1. The results in the columns refer to each of the five surveyed groups of agents, g.  
Table 1 about here 
At the univariate level, )(E 1t
g
t +π  series behave as random walks. In fact, the Dickey-Fuller 
test never rejects the null hypothesis, indicating that the forecasts are non stationary. The LM test of 
)(E 1t
g
t +πΔ  too is never rejected, suggesting that changes in inflation forecasts are not 
autocorrelated over time. Details of the test procedures are found in the footnotes of Table 1. These 
results are robust when different unit roots and/or stationarity tests, lag-selection criteria and higher-
order autocorrelations are applied. As depicted in Figure 1, though the first differences indicate 
stochastic trends, random shock seem correlated simultaneously: the first principal component still 
explains about 78 percent of the overall variance of the five )(E 1t
g
t +πΔ  time series, and their 
correlation coefficients are in the 0.55 / 0.86 range. The univariate analysis verify the first empirical 
implication of the theoretical model discussed at the end of Section II: )(E 1t
g
t +π  series are I(1) and 
their permanent innovations are not correlated over time, though can be correlated across agents.  
The bivariate cointegration tests are reported in the lower part of Table 1. We assess whether 
any pair of forecasts has a common stochastic trend. We follow the suggestion of Gonzalo and Lee 
(1998) by comparing results from alternative methods; using both Engle and Granger (1987) two-
step approach– looking for a unit root in the residuals of a first-stage static regression – and 
Johansen (1995) trace test based on the reduced rank analysis. Using the more efficient Johansen’s 
approach, the results always reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration and, thereby, suggesting 
that any pair of inflation forecasts is a stationary linear combination, as predicted at theoretical level 
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by equations (1)-(2). The same results are found, at least at the 10% level, using the Engle-Granger 
approach. 
The estimates of the corresponding slopes β for each pair of bivariate relationships are 
reported in Table 2. Since all the bivariate long run relationships are normalized in the same way, 
we can compare the β  estimates below the diagonal (using the Engle-Granger approach) with those 
symmetrically above the diagonal (using the Johansen approach). Estimates are remarkably similar 
for the different approaches and are always significantly different to both zero and one (test results 
that are not reported are available upon request). The latter result is consistent with learning agents 
setting their optimal expectations as a proportion of those of the professionals, see equations (1)-(2). 
Table 2 about here 
 The Johansen’s approach enables us to analyze the full dynamics of the bivariate systems 
where the VECM model (9) is simplified by dropping one variable and, without the imposition of 
an agent as the professional forecaster, can be represented as: 
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We can estimate the loading parameters αi and αj , and test for weak exogeneity of either )(E 1tit +π , 
i.e. αi = 0, or )(E 1tjt +π , i.e. αj = 0. As highlighted in the theoretical model, the weak exogeneity 
property identifies which forecaster of the two in the VECM (11) acts as a professional by leading 
the other.  
Table 3 presents the twenty loading parameter estimates of the ten VECM (11) that 
delivered the β estimates reported in the upper diagonal part of Table 2. In particular, each estimate 
of Table 3 below the diagonal refers to the loading parameter -αj of the group of agents indicated in 
the row from a bivariate VECM (11) whose long run relationship is normalized for the ith group of 
agents indicated in the column; the symmetrical estimate above the diagonal refers to the -αi 
loading parameter in the same VECM (11). Given the similarity of the long run estimates in Table 
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2, the more restrictive Engle-Granger approach would produce similar results to those discussed 
here. 
Table 3 about here 
In each bivariate VECM, insignificant estimates of the loading parameters suggest the weak 
exogeneity of the forecast group indicated in the row. If all the estimates in one row are never 
significant, the group in that row always acts as a professional forecaster who leads the other group, 
regardless of who is it in the bivariate VECM.  
Results in Table 3 suggest that in each of our VECM there is always one leader, as both 
loading estimates of the same VECM are never significant simultaneously. When the business 
economist forecasts (be) enter any bivariate VECM it always leads. Conversely, the general public 
forecasts (gp), is never weakly exogenous in any VECM they are part of. The other three groups of 
agents show mixed and sometime inconsistent results because the assessment is made in pair, and 
not by putting together all the five forecasts. Since β estimates are significantly different to one, the 
extension of the bivariate VECMs to a system modelling together all the five forecast groups avoids 
that the identification of the long run and of the loading parameters only depends on arbitrary 
normalization restrictions. Therefore, bivariate findings have to be further verified in the 
multivariate context. 
III.2: Multivariate linear VECMs  
The multivariate analysis starts with a first-order unrestricted VAR where the five inflation 
forecasts are jointly modelled. The choice of one-lag order (from five max-lags) is robust to a 
number of alternative methods: sequential testing-down LR test statistic and alternative Akaike, 
Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn information criteria. As the Johansen’s approach assumes vector white 
noise errors, panel [A] of Table 4 reports the P-values of the VAR residuals misspecification tests, 
both at single equation and at system level (respectively in the first five and in the last column). 
Overall the diagnostic tests suggest that first-order VAR representation of the dynamic relationships 
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among the variables of interest is data congruent and as such, it can be used as the starting point of 
the cointegration analysis.  
Table 4 about here 
Panel [B] of Table 4 reports the trace and maximum eigenvalues of the cointegration rank 
tests. The results suggest four cointegrating relationships among the five inflation forecast groups. 
This outcome is not surprising, given the evidence of the pairwise cointegration results reported in 
Table 1. Cointegrating vectors possess an invariance property: because a cointegrating vector for a 
subsystem is also a cointegrating vector for a larger system, multiple cointegrating vectors in a large 
system may be identified by finding single cointegrating vectors in subsystems. Therefore, if we 
assume that the same long run relationship previously detected are still valid at multivariate level – 
i.e. that all pairs of forecasts cointegrate – we can impose twelve just-identifying restrictions, as we 
exclude three variables from each of the four long run relationships.4 There are two possible ways to 
undertake this: (a) forecasts of all groups but one are pairwise cointegrated with that group; 5 (b) all 
forecasts groups are sequentially cointegrated. The choice of scheme (a) or (b) implies the same 
number of exact identification restrictions and, as such, cannot be tested.  
In the bivariate analysis, we note that business economist forecasts (be) are always weakly 
exogenous. So there is no point in assuming ex ante a given sequence in which the different 
forecasts are linked to each other, as would be needed with scheme (b). Therefore, we implement 
the scheme (a) and report the corresponding long run β parameters in panel [A] of Table 5. Results 
are remarkably similar to those obtained in the bivariate subsystems involving be (see the last 
column of Table 2).  
Table 5 about here 
                                                 
4 Exact identification of r cointegrating vectors (here r=4) requires the imposition of r-1 independent restrictions on 
each vector (here, twelve restrictions). Only overidentifying restrictions – i.e. those exceeding (r-1)×r – can be tested. 
5 In literature, applications of “in pair” identification schemes range from modelling the spreads cointegration among 
Treasury bill yields (see e.g. Hall et al, 1992), to the analysis of the macroeconomic fluctuations (see e.g. King et al, 
1991), and to the study of data revisions through cointegrated vintages (see e.g. Patterson, 2000 and 2003). 
 13
The identification scheme (a) for the long run gives specific6 estimates of the loading 
parameters whose significance indicates that it is the be’s forecasts that lead the others. The 
followers learn directly from the leader, and independently of the other learning agents. This can be 
verified  by testing for be weak exogeneity restrictions together with the independence of the other 
adjustment mechanisms, i.e. each learning agent only accounts for the disequilibria between her 
forecasts and those of the leader and not for the other unbalances. The independence of learning 
hypothesis imposes 16 overidentifying zero restrictions on the loading parameters matrix, i.e. the 4 
implied by the be exogeneity plus further 12 restrictions on the off-diagonal parameters of the 
loading factors matrix. 
The estimated results of the restricted VECM are reported in panel [B] of Table 5. As the 
restrictions are largely not rejected (the p-value is 0.7363), efficiency is improved without 
substantial changes in long run parameter estimates (see panel [A] and Table2). Overall, estimates 
in panel [B] of Table 5 depict learning dynamics consistent the theoretical VECM (9) representation 
of Section II. In fact, weakly exogenous be agents behave as professional forecasters and two 
groups of agents (gp and ae) can be classified as passive learners, given that their loading factors 
are significantly lower than those of fd and tu which, for this, can be classified as active learners.  
The residuals series of the VECM model estimated in panel [B] of Table 5 also corroborate 
the prediction of positively correlated errors we made on the basis of the theoretical model in 
Section II: cross-correlations coefficients for each group of agents with respect to the professional 
be are always positive and quite large (well above 0.5). This fact, together with be forecasts weak 
exogeneity, suggest the relevance of conditioning on be time series the learning agents dynamics in 
order to improve efficiency. This will be undertaken in the next section, while also relaxing the 
linearity assumption. 
III.3: Nesting models with alternative nonlinear speeds of adjustment:  
                                                 
6 In fact, choosing one scheme of identification results in different estimates and significance of the loading parameters 
which can be better interpreted under one scheme than the other; see e.g. Patterson (2003) for further explanations on 
this point. 
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So far we have assumed that the learning agents’ absorption rates are linear but Carroll 
(2003) also suggests the absorption, or adjustment, rates are likely to be non-linear. Nonlinear 
adjustments may take different forms. For example, asymmetric threshold autoregressive (TAR) 
and momentum threshold autoregressive (MTAR) models are analyzed, among the others, in Enders 
and Granger (1998) and in Enders and Siklos (2001); smooth transition autoregressive (STAR) 
models are e.g. used in Kapetanios et al (2003). 
 Following Enders and Siklos (2001), we consider a TAR alternative specification of the 
error-correction model, in which the residual t,j,iuˆ  of any bivariate static Engle-Granger’s 
cointegrating regression of the ith against jth inflation forecast group (see the results below the 
diagonal in Table 1) follows a TAR dynamics: t,i1t,it,j,i1t,j,ij,it,j,it,j,i uˆ)I1(uˆIuˆ j,i εααΔ +−+= −−−+ ; 
where subscripts i and j = 1, 2, ..., 5 identify any pair of forecaster groups, subscript t is time, Ii,j,t is 
the Heaviside indicator such that: Ii,j,t = 1 if j,i1t,j,iuˆ τ≥−  and Ii,j,t = 0 if j,i1t,j,iuˆ τ<− , and τi,j is the 
threshold for the bivariate relationship between the ith forecast group against the jth forecast group. 
Of course, the Engle-Granger (linear) cointegration approach is a special case in which −+ =
j,ij,i
αα .  
The figures below the diagonal in Table 6 are the φi,j (non-standard F) statistic for the joint 
hypothesis 0
j,ij,i
== −+ αα  (i.e. of no cointegration). Under the alternative hypothesis of TAR 
cointegration, we test for symmetry, i.e.: −+ =
j,ij,i
αα  reporting the corresponding p-values of the 
standard F distribution above the diagonal in Table 6. 
Table 6 about here 
Overall, results in Table 6 support the view that in the bivariate context the adjustment 
process of the inflation forecasts towards the target follows an asymmetric dynamics with respect to 
an estimated threshold quite close to (but not) zero.7 In fact, φi,j test statistics always reject the null 
                                                 
7 We also tested for nonlinear cointegration using STAR models (see Kapetanios et al. 2003), where the (smoothed) 
speed of the adjustment process is slower when the EG cointegrating residual is close to zero. Results were 
inconclusive, suggesting that such dynamics is not appropriate in the present context. 
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of no cointegration (only at 10% in just one case in ten), and with very few exceptions the 
symmetry F test p-values detect significantly different adjustment parameters below/above the 
threshold. Thresholds super-consistent estimates are in the -0.235 / 0.335 range, and are obtained by 
searching for the τi,j value (over the 20% trimmed t,j,iuˆ  data) which minimizes the sum of squared 
errors from the fitted model, see Chan (1993).  
 The multivariate extension of the bivariate nonlinear approach would imply a threshold 
VECM in which the threshold variable itself is determined by the cointegrating vectors that, in turn, 
must be estimated. This data-intensive approach cannot be tackled in our small sample of data 
which prevents us from obtaining reliable “full information” estimates of the nonlinear model. 
Therefore, we follow the two-step procedure recommended of Balke and Fomby (1997) and 
supported by the findings of Enders and Siklos (2001). In the first step, the cointegration rank and 
the long run parameters of the model are estimated with Johansen’s approach (results are 
summarized in Tables 4 and 5 of Section III.2). In the second step, both threshold and asymmetric 
adjustment parameters are efficiently estimated in a partial system of four equations (one for each 
gp, ae, fd and tu groups of agents) conditioned on be forecast changes )(E 1t
be
t +πΔ without loss of 
relevant information.  
The model FIML estimated at the second step may be seen as the nonlinear extension of the 
theoretical model (10), where each equation for the ith learning agent forecast changes )(E 1t
i
t +πΔ  is 
explained by an asymmetric equilibrium-correction mechanism (ecm) based on the parameters iβˆ  
and icˆ  (see Table 5, panel [B] “long run parameters”) which lead to the equilibrium correction 
series: 
]cˆ)(Eˆ)(E[mcˆe it
be
1tit
i
1t
i
1t −−= −−− πβπ  i = gp, ae, fd, tu    (12) 
The resulting four-equation conditional VECM with TAR dynamics is fully specifies as: 
gp
t
gp
1tt,gpgp
gp
1tt,gpgp1t
be
tgp1t
gp
t ]ecm)[I1(]ecm[I)](E[)(E ξααπΔηπΔ +−−−= −−−+++  
ae
t
ae
1tt,aeae
ae
1tt,aeae1t
be
tae1t
ae
t ]ecm)[I1(]ecm[I)](E[)(E ξααπΔηπΔ +−−−= −−−+++  (13) 
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fd
t
fd
1tt,fdfd
fd
1tt,fdfd1t
be
tfd1t
fd
t ]ecm)[I1(]ecm[I)](E[)(E ξααπΔηπΔ +−−−= −−−+++  
tu
t
tu
1tt,tutu
tu
1tt,tutu1t
be
ttu1t
tu
t ]ecm)[I1(]ecm[I)](E[)(E ξααπΔηπΔ +−−−= −−−+++  
 
where for i = gp, ae, fd, tu we define: Ii,t = 1 if i
i
1tmcˆe τ≥− ; and group-specific parameters 
iτ , −+ iii ,, ααη are to be estimated. Results are reported in column (1) of Table 7. As in the 
univariate context, τi estimates are grid-searched over the 20% trimmed values of the long run 
disequilibria i 1tmcˆe − ; the retained values are those which maximize the level of the likelihood of the 
whole system of equations.  
Table 7 about here 
 The asymmetric adjustment towards the long run of each learning agent depicts the two-
category stylized behavior discussed in Section II: the passive and the active groups of agents. The 
first category includes general public (gp) and academic economists (ae) whose forecasts show 
slow speeds of adjustment towards the professional/leader target (be). Asymmetry entails that 
speeds of adjustment are even slower when the forecasts of the passive agents are above the be 
target by a positive wedge τ (0.486% for gp and 0.114% for ae).  
The second category includes finance directors (fd) and trade unionist (tu) who are probably 
more keen to update their inflation expectations to inform their wage and price-setting and 
bargaining activity. However, the active learning agents’ asymmetries are considerably more 
heterogeneous than those of the passive agents. In fact, finance directors asymmetries are not 
significant, while trade unionists maximize their asymmetric behavior: they update very quickly 
their forecasts towards those of professional/leader be only when their inflation forecasts are below 
those of be, while barely behave as passive agents when their inflation forecasts are above those of 
be by more than 0.189%.  
 Following the general-to-specific approach, the VECM model (13) with TAR dynamics is 
the general unrestricted model in which a number of specific linear models with alternative speeds 
of adjustment are nested. Therefore, we can assess the overall significance of the asymmetric 
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behavior by comparing the likelihood of the VECM model (13) estimates in column (1) of Table 7 
with that of the “4-speed linear” model in column (2) which is nested in model (13) under four joint 
restrictions H0: iii ααα == −+  (i = gp, ae, fd, tu), which are a sort of asymmetry test in the context of 
a multivariate system. It is worth noting that the conditional model estimated in column (2) 
corresponds to the linear model (10) of Section II and that, the speed of adjustment estimates in 
column (2) are equal to those of VECM (9) reported in panel [B] of Table 5 (“loading parameters”), 
while the standard errors in brackets are slightly lower because the valid conditioning of VECM (9) 
entails efficiency.  
 The likelihood ratio (LR) test statistic in the lower part of column (2) rejects the null 
hypothesis of four (agent-specific) speeds of adjustment identified by the linear model (10). 
Therefore, as discussed at the end of Section II, nonlinearities matter to better explain the dynamic 
behavior of the whole system of learning agents. 
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 7 report the estimates of additional restrictions to the 
assumption of linear absorption rates and, thereby, further assess the learning dynamics. In 
particular the linear model estimated in column (3) assumes that the active/passive learning process 
entails only two speeds of adjustment: one for the passive agents (gp and ae) and the other for the 
active fd and tu. Finally, the linear model estimated in column (4) collapses the learning process in a 
single speed of adjustment and, in this way, abandons the assumption of agents learning at different 
speeds. 
 Results are unequivocal and can be summarized as follows. Firstly, nonlinearities matter to 
the learning dynamics (see LR test outcomes in column 2): both passive and active agents behave in 
a significantly different way depending on the state of their inflation expectations with respect to 
that of the professional’s in the previous period. Secondly, assuming a linear dynamics the four-
groups of learning agents identified by our analyses can be split in only two categories (see LR test 
outcomes in column 3): active and passive the learning. The clear rejection of the LR test in the 
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lower part of column (4) supports strongly the view that, even in the very restrictive linear 
framework, learning agents are differently active when accounting for professional forecasts. 
 In addition, the adjustment mechanism, in the short run the conditioning effect of the 
simultaneous changes in be inflation forecasts are always close (and never significantly different) to 
one: followers tend to move the direction of their inflation forecasts immediately and of a very 
similar amount of that of professionals. This is robust for all the alternative linear/nonlinear and 
equal/different speeds of adjustment models. The conditioning be effect should proxy for the short-
run reactivity of learning agents to the permanent innovations in the inflationary process expected 
by professional forecasters.  
If this is the case, residuals’ correlation coefficients of the conditional models in Table 7 
measure the correlation between the learning agents’ idiosyncratic shocks to inflation forecasts. 
Though smaller than the correlations discussed at the VECM estimation stage (in Table 5) because 
here the permanent innovations in the inflationary process expected by professional forecasters have 
been extracted through conditioning, they are still quite high (in the 0.4-0.5 range) denoting a sort 
of consensus of the learning agents in assessing future inflation shocks, e.g. due to pre-announced 
monetary and fiscal policies (not reported results are available upon request to the authors). 
III.4: Discussion of results:  
 The bivariate and multivariate analyses indicate clearly that the business economists evolve 
independently. It establishes the business economists unequivocally as the professional forecaster 
from whom others base their inflation expectations. Though the multivariate analysis suggests that 
learning agents form their expectations by observing the business economists directly, the bivariate 
analysis suggests that learning agents may also partly observe the professional’s forecasts via other 
learning agents. It latter is unsurprising as Carroll (2006) argues that households not only observe 
the professional’s forecasts via the news media but also through social interaction with other 
households. On the one hand, the general public’s expectations adjust to all the other learning 
agents’ expectations while the academic economists only adjust to the business economists. Trade 
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unionists adjust to both financial directors and academic economists and the financial directors 
adjust to the academic economists.  
The empirical analyses also indicate that there is a slightly greater than one-to-one long-run 
relationship between professional’s and the learning agents’ forecasts. The learning agent may not 
be entirely clear the type of inflation the professional is forecasting. For example, is it Retail Price 
Index (RPI) or Consumer Price Index (CPI)? Indeed, different segments of the population may be 
affected by raising prices differently due to their consumption patterns. Hence, they may prefer to 
simply use the professional’s forecasts as a reference point and erring slightly on the caution by 
setting a slightly greater than one ratio.  
 An important purpose of the present analysis is to identify and distinguish between ‘active’ 
and ‘passive’ agents as defined by their respective absorption rate. We identify trade unions and 
financial directors as the ‘active’ learners with absorption rates around 0.64 and 0.66 respectively. It 
is unsurprising that both these agents have relatively high absorption rates. Trade union officials are 
frequently involved in wage negotiations on behalf of their members, while financial directors may 
be engaged in both wage and price-setting on behalf of their firm and also they would be interested 
in their firm’s relative prices (the firm’s price relative to aggregate price). Hence, they need to form 
inflation expectations readily and frequently.   
The general public and academic economist, on the other hand, constitute the passive 
learners. The general public may choose to update their expectations less frequently due to the costs 
of acquiring the relevant information. In the case of academic economists, it may seem perplexing 
in the first instances that they adjust their expectations to the business economists. On further 
reflection it may be less surprising. Most academic economists, even though they may have the 
expertise, may not develop formal models or, more importantly, update constantly the relevant 
information required to forecasts inflation. They too may rely on the forecasts of business 
economists whose very job is to undertake this.           
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The non-linear analyses try to establish whether the learning agent absorb asymmetrically. 
We find that the learning agents, with one exception, follow a TAR adjustment process. In the case 
of the passive learners, they absorb faster when their expectations are below the ‘anchored’ value of 
the business economists. The estimated threshold is positive, albeit small. This is consistent with the 
arguments purported in Akerlof et al (1996 and 2000). They argue that ignorance would be more 
costly for households during periods of high inflation. These periods have greater adverse effect on 
households’ real wages than low inflation periods.  Hence, they would update their expectations 
more readily during these periods with the view of adjusting their behavior. Amongst the active 
learners, the trade union officials display a similar asymmetric behavior. The trade unions, for 
reasons similar to the general public, would be more concerned to update their inflation 
expectations during periods of high inflation. Conversely, financial directors absorb the 
professional’s forecasts symmetrically. Financial directors should be equally concerned about high 
and low inflation rates. During periods of high inflation rates they would be concerned with rising 
costs, while during periods of low inflation they would be concerned about rising relative prices.   
IV: Summary and Concluding Remarks: 
An important recent theory explaining how households form inflation expectations is the 
‘sticky information expectations’ model. The underlining inattentive behavior of learning agents has 
been used to explain inflation dynamics and the implications for the pursuit of disinflationary has 
also been considered. The purpose of the present paper is to extend the microfoundations of how 
households form inflation expectations. We consider how different agents learning agents 
representing different segments of the population may update their inflation expectations. We 
consider two stylized learning agents – ‘active’ and ‘passive’ learners, as defined by their 
absorption rate as they observe the professional’s forecasts.  
We outline a theoretical model which accounts for learning agents with different absorption 
rates which extends the microfoundations of ‘sticky information expectations’ and motive the 
ensuing empirical analysis. The empirical investigation uses a unique dataset complied by Barclays 
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Basix based on surveys of various sections of the UK population. The results identify the business 
economists as the professional forecaster as their forecasts evolve independently. The four learning 
agents update their inflation expectations by absorbing the business economist’s forecasts. The 
results also suggest that some of them may observe the professional’s forecasts via fellow learning 
agents. Hence, learning via social interaction may also take place. The results showed that the 
absorption rates, with one exception, are asymmetric. It suggests that higher inflation expectations 
would increase the rate of absorption.  
The different absorption rates of different segments of the population explain the 
heterogeneity found amongst different agents. Disagreements amongst different agents’ 
expectations simply reflect the different rates by which various agents may observe relevant 
information and update their expectations rather than any underlying theory of inflation dynamics. 
Undoubtedly, this also raises a question about inflation dynamics: are absorption rates of active 
learners (trade unionists and financial directors) more important in determining inflation dynamics? 
The active learners identified in the present study play a crucial role in wage and price-setting 
behavior. These are issues that modellers of inflation dynamics based on ‘sticky information 
expectations’ need to consider.  
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Tab. 1 – Inflation forecasts series by group of agents over the 1986q4-2005q1 period 
Group a: gp ae fd tu be 
Univariate analysis:   
Levels’ unit root test, p-values b 0.5305 0.7533 0.6901 0.6835 0.7146 
First differences’ LM test, p-values c 0.4868 0.8950 0.7250 0.5268 0.9471 
Bivariate cointegration: d   
gp 41.67 38.53 38.69 36.63 
ae -2.85 28.66 32.17 20.70 
fd -5.50 -2.94 35.82 29.45 
tu -3.07 -2.86 -6.08  35.65 
be -5.23 -2.89 -3.26 -3.23  
(a) The surveyed five groups of agents are: general public (gp), academic economist (ae), finance 
director (fd), trade unionist (tu), and business economist (be). 
(b) Dickey and Fuller (1979) test equation truncation lags are set by applying the MAIC (Modified AIC) 
selection rule of Ng and Perron (2001). 
(c) Godfrey (1988) 4th order autocorrelation LM test for inflation forecasts in first differences. 
(d) Below the diagonal, Engle and Granger (1987, EG) unit-root test on the residual of the two-in-two 
regression: )(E 1tjt +π  = c + β )(E 1tit +π  + u , where i is the row-group and j the column-group 
(truncation lags of the residuals unit-root test equation are MAIC-selected). EG 1%, 5% and 10% 
critical values: -3.77, -3.17 and -2.84 (see Engle and Granger, 1987, Table II).  
Above the diagonal, Johansen (1995) trace test for r = 0 ; r is the cointegration rank in the VAR for 
)(E),(E 1t
j
t1t
i
t ++ ππ with intercept restricted to lie in the cointegration space; 5% critical values: 20.26 
(see MacKinnon et al., 1999). VAR lag-order is selected on the basis of Schwarz Information 
Criterion, see Ivanov and Kilian (2005). 
 
 
 
Tab. 2 – Estimates of the bivariate cointegration parameters 
Group a, b gp ae fd tu be
gp  0.997 1.063 0.937 1.179
ae 0.935  1.061 0.938 1.174
fd 0.980 1.048  0.885 1.100
tu 0.865 0.917 0.868  1.242
be 1.041 1.149 1.089 1.223  
(a) Group labels: general public (gp), academic economist (ae), finance director (fd), 
trade unionist (tu), and business economist (be). 
(b) Below the diagonal, the OLS β estimates of the two-in-two EG regressions: 
)(E 1t
j
t +π  = c + β )(E 1tit +π  + u , where i is the row- and j the column-group.  
Above the diagonal, the β estimates of the two-in-two )(E),(E 1tjt1tit ++ ππ  
Johansen cointegrating vector (1 -β) normalized for the ith group in the row.  
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Tab. 3 – Estimates of the loading parameters in bivariate VECMs 
Group a, b gp ae fd tu be 
gp   0.5094**  0.4554** 0.3996** 0.3867** 
ae 0.1105   0.2346 0.0022 0.4882** 
fd 0.1040 -0.4142*  0.0047 0.7087** 
tu 0.0132 -0.6839** -0.7885**  0.7232** 
be 0.0536  0.1109  0.1587 0.1286  
(a) Group labels: general public (gp), academic economist (ae), finance director (fd), trade unionist 
(tu), and business economist (be). 
(b) Each estimate below the diagonal refers to the loading parameter αj of the group of agents in the 
row from a bivariate VECM (11) whose long run relationship is normalized for the ith group in 
the column; the symmetrical estimate above the diagonal refers to αi in the same VECM. ** and * 
respectively reject at 1% and 10% the null that the loading parameter estimate is zero; in other 
terms, any not significant estimate classifies as weakly exogenous the group of agents in the 
row, whose forecasts lead those of the group of agents indicated in the column.  
 
 
 
 
 
Tab. 4 – Multivariate analysis: VECM diagnostics and cointegration testing 
 Group/equation a 
[A] Misspecification tests, p-val. gp ae fd tu be sys
Autocorrelation LM of  
1st order 0.2666 0.6778 0.6054 0.5624 0.8956 0.2303
5th order 0.7178 0.7158 0.8154 0.7621 0.9735 0.8086
White heteroskedasticity 0.1832 0.7431 0.1991 0.3258 0.169 0.0001
ARCH test of  
1st order 0.1100 0.0032 0.1621 0.0005 0.0810 0.0199
5th order 0.0000 0.0174 0.0029 0.0189 0.4082 0.0553
Normality 0.0539 0.0331 0.0723 0.2463 0.0431 0.2013
[B] Cointegration test H0: Eigenvalue
Trace 
statistic P-val. 
b Max-eigenval. P-val. 
b  
rank = 0 0.4515 135.19 0.0000 43.84 0.0032  
rank ≤ 1 0.4002 91.35 0.0000 37.31 0.0030  
rank ≤ 2 0.3495 54.04 0.0002 31.39 0.0021  
rank ≤ 3 0.2365 22.65 0.0230 19.70 0.0120  
rank ≤ 4 0.0397 2.96 0.5886 2.96 0.5886  
(a) Groups: general public (gp), academic economist (ae), finance director (fd), trade unionist (tu), and busi-
ness economist (be). There is an equation for each group, the last column is for the system as a whole (sys).  
(b) MacKinnon et al (1999) p-values 
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        Tab. 5 – Multivariate analysis: imposing cointegration restrictions 
[A] Long run relationships a, b #1 #2 #3 #4  
gp 1 0 0 0  
ae 0 1 0 0  
fd 0 0 1 0  
tu 0 0 0 1  
be -1.1855 -1.1911 -1.1124 -1.2559  
const -0.6508 0.5455 0.2636 0.4884  
[B] be exogeneity and feedback effects independence a, b, c 
          long run relationships: #1 #2 #3 #4  
gp 1 0 0 0  
ae 0 1 0 0  
fd 0 0 1 0  
tu 0 0 0 1  
be -1.1714 -1.1752 -1.1040 -1.2492  
 (0.0734) (0.0353) (0.0270) (0.0396)  
const -0.7025 0.4973 0.2341 0.4687  
(0.2789) (0.1341) (0.1024) (0.1504)  
loading parameters α:   
gp 0.4115 0 0 0  
(0.0456)   
ae 0 0.4661 0 0  
 (0.0721)   
fd 0 0 0.6408 0  
(0.0850)   
tu 0 0 0 0.6617  
(0.0817)  
be 0 0 0 0  
correlation coefficients d 0.5670 0.8773 0.8450 0.6853  
(a) In bold, 5% significant estimates.  
(b) Groups: general public (gp), academic economist (ae), finance director (fd), trade 
unionist (tu), and busi-ness economist (be).  
(c) Figures in brackets are parameter standard errors. Overall, the 16 zero overidentifying 
restrictions imposed to loading parameters are not rejected (p-value = 0.7363). 
(d) Each column reports the estimate of the coefficient of correlation with respect to be 
equation’s residuals of, respectively, gp, ae, fd and tu equations’ residuals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 27
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tab. 6 –TAR asymmetric cointegration test a  
Group b, c gp ae fd tu be 
gp  0.0436 0.0043 0.0091 0.0254 
ae 10.16  0.0300 0.0795 0.0282 
fd 9.70 6.70  0.0003 0.3359 
tu 7.19 16.57 17.15  0.0768 
be 7.88 10.40 13.85 7.25  
(a) Following Chan (1993), superconsistent thresholds estimates are obtained by searching 
over the 20% trimmed residuals of the EG approach, and taking the τ yielding the lowest 
sum of squared errors from the fitted model.  
(b) Group labels: general public (gp), academic economist (ae), finance director (fd), trade 
unionist (tu), and business economist (be). 
(c) Below the diagonal there are the no-cointegration φ test statistics on any pair of EG static 
regression residuals which lead to below-the-diagonal Table 1 results, see Enders and 
Siklos (2001, ES); φ 1%, 5% and 10% critical values are respectively: 9.58, 7.10 and 
6.00, on the basis of ES, Tab. 5 p. 172. The truncation lag is set following the testing 
down approach of Ng and Perron (1995) from a max-lag = 4, and keeping the higher 
augmentation parameter estimate when 10% significant; the resulting truncation lag was 
zero with few exceptions. 
Above the diagonal there are the standard (under cointegration) F statistic p-values of 
equal adjustment speed (symmetric adjustment and linear context) null hypothesis.  
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Tab. 7 – FIML estimates of alternative conditional VECMs 
 TAR dynamics 4-speed linear 2-speed linear 1-speed linear 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  τ estimate s.e. estimate s.e. estimate s.e. estimate s.e. 
αgp + 0.486 0.2470 0.1052 0.4115 0.0450 
0.4201 0.0414 
0.4725 0.0422 
− 0.4364 0.0477 
αae + 0.114 0.2332 0.1254 0.4661 0.0708 − 0.5382 0.0832 
αfd + -0.120 0.6883 0.0994 0.6408 0.0836 
0.6452 0.0630 
− 0.4897 0.1437 
αtu + 0.189 0.3830 0.1308 0.6617 0.0805 − 0.7769 0.0985 
       
ηi 
gp  0.7448 0.1201 0.7135 0.1201 0.7103 0.1200 0.6964 0.1469 
ae  1.0216 0.0639 1.0307 0.0652 1.0333 0.0652 1.0299 0.0687 
fd  0.9305 0.0670 0.9355 0.0689 0.9349 0.0688 0.9476 0.1019 
tu  0.8196 0.1041 0.8452 0.1050 0.8473 0.1048 0.8726 0.1209 
           
 LogL 58.78 52.91 52.63 46.07 
restriction:    (2) vs (1) (3) vs (2) (3) vs (1) (4) vs (3) 
 LR    11.73 0.57 12.30 13.12 
 d.o.f.    4 2 6 1 
 P-val    0.0195 0.7512 0.0556 0.0003 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 – Inflation forecasts one-year ahead by group 
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